

































A report submitted as a partial requirement for the degree of Bachelor of Psychology 
with Honours at the University of Tasmania, 2019.  
ii 
Statement of Sources 
I declare that this report is my own original work and that contributions of others 
have been duly acknowledged. 
_________________________________ 






I would like to thank everyone who helped me complete my Honours thesis. I 
would especially like to thank my supervisor Christine Padgett for all of her 
guidance and support. I also express gratitude to my fellow Honours student Emma 
Smith for her assistance in developing the survey and providing her support as well. 
To my family, thank you for all of your patience and support. In particular, I 
would like to thank my Mum for her unwaivering support and patience for the many 
emails and drafts that she had to read. A huge appreciation and thanks must also go 
to my partner Liam for his constant encouragement and always keeping me 
motivated.  
To my honours cohort, thank you for all your encouragement. Especially 
Hanna, for without her I do not think I could have gotten through this year, let alone 
the previous years of our schooling together. Thank you also to everyone who helped 
advertise the study. 
A final thankyou must also go to all participants who were kind enough to 






Table of Contents 
List of Tables ............................................................................................................ vii 
List of Figures .......................................................................................................... viii 
Title Page ................................................................................................................. viii 
Abstract ....................................................................................................................... 1 
Introduction ................................................................................................................ 2 
The MAOA Gene ..................................................................................................... 3 
Courtroom Application of the MAOA Gene ........................................................... 4 
Empirical Evidence .................................................................................................. 6 
Mitigating effects in empirical evidence. ............................................................. 6 
Aggravating empirical evidence. ......................................................................... 8 
Empirical evidence and noncapital crimes. .......................................................... 9 
Summary of empirical evidence......................................................................... 11 
Type of Crime ........................................................................................................ 12 
Focal Concerns Theory .......................................................................................... 13 
Present Study .......................................................................................................... 15 
Method ...................................................................................................................... 17 
Design .................................................................................................................... 17 
Participants ............................................................................................................. 17 
Materials ................................................................................................................. 19 
Procedure ............................................................................................................... 22 





Results ....................................................................................................................... 23 
Data Screening ....................................................................................................... 23 
Results .................................................................................................................... 25 
Perceptions of Culpability ...................................................................................... 28 
Perceptions of Dangerousness ............................................................................... 29 
Sentence Severity Judgments ................................................................................. 30 
Discussion .................................................................................................................. 33 
Genetic Evidence on Perceptions of the Defendant and Sentence Severity 
Judgements ............................................................................................................. 34 
The Influence of Genetic Evidence in Different Types of Crime .......................... 37 
Strengths, Limitations and Future Directions ........................................................ 40 
Implications and Conclusion .................................................................................. 42 
References ................................................................................................................. 44 
Appendix A. Ethics Approval ................................................................................... 51 
Appendix B. Participant Recruitment Flyer for On-Campus .................................... 53 
Appendix C. Participant Online Recruitment Advertisement ................................... 54 
Appendix D. Demographic Information ................................................................... 55 
Appendix E. Vignettes .............................................................................................. 56 
Appendix F. Dependent Variable Questions ............................................................ 58 
Appendix G. Public Understanding and Attitudes towards Genetics and Genomics 





Appendix H. Participant Information Sheet .............................................................. 62 
Appendix I. Participant Consent Form ..................................................................... 64 







List of Tables 
Table 1. Participant Demographic Information ......................................................... 18 
Table 2. Between Group Differences on Demographic and Genetic Knowledge 
Factors ........................................................................................................................ 24 
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics for Genetic and Nongenetic Conditions ................... 26 
Table 4. Descriptive Statistics for Blue-Collar and White-Collar Conditions .......... 27 
Table 5. Chi-Square for Punishment Type for Genetic and Nongenetic Conditions 31 
Table 6. Chi-Square for Punishment Type for Blue-Collar and White-Collar 







List of Figures 
Figure 1. Bar graph of gene and crime-type conditions for culpability (error bars: 
95% CI) ...................................................................................................................... 28 
Figure 2. Bar graph of gene and crime-type conditions for dangerousness (error bars: 
95% CI) ...................................................................................................................... 29 
Figure 3. Bar graph for gene and crime-type conditions for jail years (error bars: 

























Bethany R. Muir 
 
 








The Monoamine Oxidase A (MAOA) gene, paired with a traumatic childhood 
background, can predispose an individual to behave impulsively and aggressively. 
Defence lawyers see this genetic link as a way to reduce a defendant’s sentence. This 
study endeavoured to establish whether mock jurors see this evidence as grounds for 
reducing a sentence, or, as the literature indicates, likely to increase it, on the basis of 
dangerousness. The influence of genetic evidence on crime-type differences (i.e., 
assault compared to bank fraud) was also investigated. A total of 217 participants 
(148 females) between 18–75 years of age (M = 31.35, SD = 14.18) were randomly 
allocated to one of four conditions detailing a crime (white-collar or blue-collar) and 
additional expert evidence regarding the possession of the MAOA gene (with a 
control group). Participants, acting as mock jurors, completed questions regarding 
judgements of the defendant’s level of culpability, level of dangerousness, and how 
severe the sentence should be. Findings demonstrated that mock jurors who received 
additional genetic evidence viewed the defendant as less culpable for the crime and 
more dangerous, but overall, provided a less harsh sentence than those who were not 
presented with such evidence. Crime-type differences were found only for 
perceptions of dangerousness, showing that blue-collar criminals with the MAOA 
gene were seen as more dangerous than white-collar criminals with the gene. These 
findings suggest that while perceptions of dangerousness are heightened, jurors 
believe a mitigated sentence is warranted for a defendant who possesses the MAOA 
gene. This has implications for defence lawyers who can utilise this form of evidence 









Genes play an influential role in human characteristics and behaviour 
(Scurich & Appelbaum, 2017). The effect of some genes (i.e., genes that determine 
our appearance) are more obvious and influential than others. Other genes can 
remain unknown or hidden to the individual and the rest of the world for a number of 
years, until an event occurs which brings the gene into play. Lombroso (1876, as 
cited in Baum, 2013) was the first to theorise that some individuals are born to be 
criminals. While his ideas were broadly rejected, this was the foundation of the idea 
that biological characteristics - including an individual’s genotype - may influence 
behaviour. While it is now the general consensus that genetics and environment play 
an interacting role in influencing human behaviour, how we use that information - 
specifically in relation to forensic decisions - is the subject of current discussion.  
Of particular relevance for forensic decisions is the Monoamine Oxidase A 
(MAOA) gene. MAOA can predispose an individual to behave more impulsive and 
aggressive in their adulthood, however it has been demonstrated that this only occurs 
when coupled with the presence of serious childhood trauma (Caspi et al., 2002). 
This link between the MAOA gene and aggressive behaviour has led to its 
controversial introduction as a form of evidence in courtroom trials (Appelbaum, 
2005), raising the question: ‘Should genetic information be presented in court as a 
form of mitigating evidence?’  
While a small number of cases (predominantly from the USA) have 
successfully implemented this evidence which has resulted in lesser sentences (e.g., 
McSwiggan, Elger, & Appelbaum, 2017), empirical research has not found strong 
evidence of judges or jurors considering this information as mitigating. Instead, 
research has demonstrated mixed effects, with some showing mitigating effects (e.g., 






aggravating effects (e.g., harsher sentencing decisions; Lui, Reiter, Barry, & 
Robinson, 2019), and others showing that the evidence neither mitigates nor 
aggravates sentences (Appelbaum & Scurich, 2014). These inconsistent results 
demonstrate the need for further research to determine whether there is an effect of 
genetic information in juror decision making and whether this effect is mitigating, 
aggravating, or a balance of both.  
Furthermore, investigation into whether this information differs depending on 
the type of crime is warranted as this has been neglected in previous literature. Such 
information may provide understanding into decision making in courtrooms in order 
to inform lawyers as to whether introducing this type of evidence would be a viable 
defence strategy. To understand this issue, further research into the effect of 
behavioural genetic evidence is needed.  
The MAOA Gene 
The MAOA gene has recently gained attention as an example of a single gene 
influencing a person’s susceptibility to aggression and violence. This effect was first 
described by research into a Dutch family’s genetics, which found that men who 
demonstrated unusually high impulsive, aggressive, and antisocial behaviour, also 
possessed a rare mutation on the X chromosome that resulted in the absence of the 
MAOA enzyme (Brunner, Nelen, Breakefield, Ropers, & van Oost, 1993). While a 
complete absence of MAOA expression is rare, there are two main variants (known 
as alleles) of the MAOA gene – low and high – which differ in level of expression 
and associated neurotransmitter levels, such as serotonin and dopamine (González-
Tapia & Obsuth, 2015). The low variant (MAOA-L) is associated with reduced 
production of serotonin and other neurotransmitters that inhibit impulsive and 






violence. Reduced levels of serotonin, in particular, has been demonstrated to be 
associated with violence (Moore, Scarpa, & Raine, 2002), and indeed, the men in 
Brunner et al.’s study demonstrated aggressive behaviour.  
Although the impact of MAOA-L possession is not substantial in isolation, 
there is compelling evidence that it exerts a sizable effect when paired with hostile 
environmental stimuli. This was demonstrated in Caspi et al.’s (2002) longitudinal 
study of male children, involving measures of antisocial behaviour up until 26 years 
years of age. It was found that 85% of children who had been maltreated and 
possessed a low level of MAOA showed some form of impulsive and antisocial 
behaviour in their adult years. However those with the low MAOA genotype that had 
not been maltreated showed significantly less antisocial behaviour. Individuals who 
endured childhood maltreatment with a genotype consisting of high levels of the 
MAOA genotype were also significantly less likely to develop this violent 
predisposition (Caspi et al., 2002). This suggests that possessing only low levels of 
the MAOA gene, combined with childhood maltreatment, increased the chances of 
impulsive and violent behaviour. Since Caspi et al.’s findings, a number of studies 
have supported this relationship (e.g., Klasen et al., 2018; Taylor & Kim-Cohen, 
2007).  
Courtroom Application of the MAOA Gene 
The discovery of the MAOA-L gene’s influence on human behaviour raises 
potential for lawyers to argue that defendant sentences should be reduced, on the 
basis that the gene reduces voluntary control (Appelbaum, 2005). This type of 
evidence has typically been introduced during the sentencing stage – whereby the 
court looks at factors that mitigate (i.e., reduce) or aggravate (i.e., increase) the 






to mitigate a sentence was Mobley v. State (1995), which, although unsuccessful, was 
the beginning of the consideration of this information as a form of evidence. Since 
then a number of criminal cases have attempted to implement this evidence, with 
mixed success. Analysis of the 33 criminal cases that have implemented behavioural 
genetic evidence between 2007–2011 showed that in all cases, genetic information 
was always considered and no court completely rejected the introduction of the 
evidence (Denno, 2011). This suggests that genetic information has merit in its use 
as a form of evidence. As for the impact the evidence had on the courts, this was 
varied and case dependent. A number of cases (e.g., Brant v. State, 2009; Creech v. 
Hardison, 2010) stated that although genetic evidence was considered as mitigating 
evidence, it was not strong enough to outweigh the aggravating evidence (e.g., 
premeditation of the crime; nature of the crime; Denno, 2011). Another review, of 11 
cases between 1995–2016, found that behavioural genetic evidence appeared to be 
successful in mitigating moral culpability, but did not completely excuse an accused 
from full criminal responsibility (McSwiggan et al., 2017). 
Other cases have given behavioural genetics more weight, resulting in 
sentences being mitigated. An example of a successful case is State v. Waldroup 
(2011). Spurred by a domestic dispute, Waldroup violently killed his wife’s friend 
and attempted to kill his own wife with a machete. Whilst assessing Waldroup, the 
forensic psychiatrist discovered that he possessed a variant gene with a deficiency of 
MAOA. The psychiatrist testified that this deficiency, added to Waldroup’s history 
of childhood maltreatment, predisposed him to violent behaviour. This gene-
environmental evidence led the jury to charge him with voluntary manslaughter 






Overall, the court case findings suggest that while behavioural genetic 
evidence is not rejected as a form of evidence, its mitigating potency may be too 
weak. As a result, the evidence may not lead to reduced sentences, especially if 
outweighed by aggravating evidence. Nevertheless, the use of genetic evidence has 
resulted in successful mitigation. 
Empirical Evidence 
Mitigating effects in empirical evidence. 
One of the first studies to investigate the impact of genetic evidence in the 
legal context looked at 181 judges’ responses as to whether or not genetic 
information (that indicated psychopathy) mitigated or aggravated outcomes in a 
hypothetical defence case (Aspinwall, Brown, & Tabery, 2012). Participants were 
presented with the same vignette detailing an aggravated battery court case. 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two presenting party conditions (i.e., 
the evidence was presented as mitigating by the defence, or aggravating by the 
prosecution), and one of two biomechanism conditions (i.e., expert testimony 
diagnosing him only of psychopathy, or expert testimony diagnosing him with 
psychopathy as well as an explanation of how the MAOA gene contributed to this). 
While overall the psychopathy evidence was perceived to be aggravating, the 
presentation of additional biomechanism information resulted in lower sentences 
(average 12.83 years) compared to no additional information (average 13.93 years). 
This suggests that introducing information about the MAOA gene and underlying 
biological causes of defendant behaviour can have mitigating results. 
In an attempt to replicate Aspinwall et al.’s (2012) findings, a study involving 
German judges was conducted, following the same methodology (Fuss et al., 2015). 






judges saw the evidence as aggravating overall, the majority of German judges found 
the evidence as mitigating overall. The presentation of additional biomechanism 
information resulted in lower perceived legal responsibility, especially when 
presented by the defence, however this did not impact sentence length. There were, 
however, increased responses of involuntary commitment to a psychiatric hospital 
when the evidence was presented by the prosecution. In other words, judges saw this 
evidence as an indication of the defendant being more dangerous, and suggested a 
rehabilitative approach. These results are in contrast with Aspinwall et al.’s study, 
possibly because judges in their study were told rehabilitation was not an option. It is 
also possible that differences between these studies may be due to jurisdiction or 
cultural differences (McSwiggan et al., 2017) – aspects that have also been 
speculated upon in other research (e.g., Cheung & Heine, 2015).  
Similar studies have attempted to replicate these findings in jury samples. Lui 
et al. (2019) investigated whether different causal accounts of psychopathy (genetic 
or environmental) influenced perceptions of the offender. They presented 
undergraduate students (potential jurors) with one of five conditions which 
manipulated sex of the offender and the aetiology of the psychopathy diagnosis. 
Participants were asked a number of questions regarding culpability, recidivism, 
amenability to change, and sentence severity. Consistent with previously mentioned 
studies, genetic explanations resulted in views of less culpability, but in this case, 
increased sentence severity. Lui et al.’s study was limited in its exclusive use of 
undergraduate students, who generally make up only a small representation of 






Aggravating empirical evidence. 
Judges and jurors may feel inclined to administer harsher penalties for 
defendants who pose a threat to society and who are more likely to commit crimes 
again in the future if released (Padayatty & Chandra, 2009). Genetic explanations 
may elicit increased fear of a defendant through implying that they lack control of 
behaviour, and cannot be cured or rehabilitated (Berryessa, 2014). Appelbaum, 
Scurich, and Raad (2015) presented three different legal cases to a representative 
sample of the U.S. population (N = 960), with different variations of additional 
evidence presented (e.g., regarding the possession of a violence-prone gene) and 
asked participants several questions regarding their perceptions of the defendant, and 
sentencing suggestions. Participants were shown three legal cases: A description of a 
murder and asked to determine sentence length; the description of a kidnapping and 
murder and asked to consider whether the defendant should be found guilty by 
insanity; and a capital murder case and asked whether the defendant should receive 
either the death penalty or life in jail. Results showed that there was no significant 
effect (neither mitigating nor aggravating) of genetic evidence on the severity of 
punishment given. This was consistent with their pilot study (Appelbaum & Scurich, 
2014), which otherwise found that although participants were more apprehensive and 
fearful of gene-predisposed defendants, there was no effect on sentence severity.  
This effect was also found in Costa, Pate, and Gibson’s (2017) study. In 
particular, the researchers found that while there was no influence on sentencing 
decisions, combining a genetic predisposition with an environmental explanation 
(i.e., childhood abuse) resulted in greater apprehensiveness, as this suggested that the 
defendant had even less control over their behaviour. This finding demonstrates the  






act between the heightened apprehensiveness of the defendant, but also the 
recognition that their actions were out of their control, thus assigning less culpability 
(Dar-Nimrod & Heine, 2011). A noted ecological limitation in these studies is the 
fact that jurors are not always involved in sentencing decisions. In the USA and a 
number of other jurisdictions, jurors may only be involved in capital punishment 
sentencing, deciding whether or not the defendant should be sentenced to death 
(Appelbaum et al., 2015). Nevertheless, it is still important for research to explore 
this impact of genetic information on public attitudes, regardless of whether or not 
they recommend sentencing. 
Empirical evidence and noncapital crimes. 
While the majority of researchers have opted to study the effects of genetic 
information on death penalty cases, there are a small number of studies that looked at 
the influence of genetic evidence on noncapital crimes. Scurich and Appelbaum 
(2015), for example, asked 640 members of the general population to consider three 
events that involved lesser offences (i.e., an assault with a deadly weapon; a college 
student who broke a window; and a misbehaving eight-year old at home). 
Participants were randomly assigned to different explanations of behaviour, such as 
genetics or an abusive childhood. Across the three cases, the effect of genetic 
explanations was not found to differ depending on severity of offenses, nor if the 
crime was nonviolent. The researchers concluded that in contrast with the common 
assumption that people may hold genetic determinism beliefs (i.e., genetics 
predominantly control all human behaviour), it appears that the general public 
consider genes to have little impact on behaviour (Scurich & Appelbaum, 2015).  
Robbins and Litton (2018) also investigated the impact of crime severity and 






participants (a robbery or a homicide) committed by a defendant with a brain 
disorder. Randomly allocated explanations of how the defendant received his brain 
disorder were then provided; either genetic (e.g., possession of MAOA gene), 
environmental (e.g., childhood abuse) or accidental. They found a small significant 
effect of crime-type on blame and punishment (more blame and severe sentencing 
allocated to homicide than robbery). While it is unsurprising that more severe 
sentences would be conferred for a murder (compared to robbery), it is interesting 
that blameworthiness also increased, suggesting that crime-type may have an 
influence on perceived culpability. Robbins and Litton’s study also found that 
defendants were perceived as more blameworthy and more deserving of punishment 
when the aetiology of the brain/mental disorder was genetic rather than 
environmental. In other words, offenders who have a genetically caused brain 
impairment (i.e., MAOA gene) are likely to be judged more negatively than 
offenders who have an environmentally caused impairment (i.e., childhood abuse).  
Robbins and Litton (2018) suggest that this result is consistent with the 
theory of dyadic morality (Gray & Wegner, 2011) – which suggests that people make 
judgments about situations (including criminal acts) through their perception of 
individuals being moral agents (i.e., having the capacity to perform actions) or moral 
patients (i.e., being on the receiving end of actions or experiencing events out of their 
control). The theory suggests that if an offender is perceived as a victim of harm then 
they are seen to be less blameworthy or culpable for an action. As Robbins and 
Litton’s study exhibited, a person who experienced childhood trauma is seen as a 
victim of harm, and thus, less culpable for a crime. A possible limitation for this 
study may be that some scenarios implied that the cause was a brain injury. This has 






as having diminished responsibility due to injury alone, rather than the genetic or 
environmental explanations. The study also heavily focused on brain structure while 
explaining the offender’s behaviour which might have added a layer of complexity 
and may have confused participants. It should also be noted that there was no 
interaction between crime-type and aetiology of injury. 
Summary of empirical evidence. 
The empirical research suggests that behavioural genetic evidence has the 
potential to either be mitigating, aggravating, or have no direct effect. There are a 
range of possibilities as to why this may be the case. The nature of the genetic 
information is such that on one hand it reduces blameworthiness of the defendant’s 
behaviour, but on the other hand, it increases the likelihood of similar acts of 
aggression to occur (Scurich & Appelbaum, 2017). This double-edged sword has 
been demonstrated in a number of studies whereby genetic evidence functioned as 
both a mitigating and aggravating factor (e.g., Fuss et al., 2015; Lui et al., 2019). As 
stated by a judge in Aspinwall et al.’s (2012, p. 848) study: “Psychopathy may make 
the defendant less morally culpable, but it increases his future dangerousness to 
society. In my mind, these factors balance out”. This epitomises the majority of 
findings in research – while perceptions of culpability may decrease, sentence 
severity ratings were either unaffected (Appelbaum & Scurich, 2014; Appelbaum et 
al., 2015; Costa et al., 2017) or aggravated (Fuss et al., 2015; Lui et al., 2019), rather 
than mitigated. It should be noted that a number of studies who found aggravated 
sentences used psychopathy as their genetic predisposition, something which has 
stigma attached to it, which may account for the harsher sentencing (Aspinwall et al., 
2012; Lui et al., 2019). There is also the possibility that jurors may just not view 






Tabb, Lebowitz, & Appelbaum, 2018), and so behavioural genetic evidence simply 
does not sanction for an excuse for reducing culpability or severity of sentences 
(Scurich & Appelbaum, 2017). 
Type of Crime 
As previously discussed, genetic evidence, including the MAOA-L gene, has 
most commonly been associated with and used as evidence in homicide trials 
(Denno, 2011). As discussed by Levitt and Manson (2007), it is plausible that the 
MAOA-L gene could be associated with nonviolent crimes should they be impulsive 
in nature, given that the interaction between MAOA-L and childhood trauma is 
associated with poor impulse control. Thus it is the impulsiveness, not necessarily 
the severity of the crime, which is important to consider when MAOA-L is used as 
evidence. For example, consider a person with the MAOA-L gene who has just 
committed a murder, that was planned for weeks and executed calmly when the time 
was right. While this crime is certainly violent, and there is a link between the gene 
deficiency and violence, it is unlikely that this defence is justified given that the 
evidence showed the defendant had full control over his actions. In comparison, take 
the example of a bank clerk who was rejected for a promotion, and, in a fit of 
uncontrollable rage, transfers funds from other accounts into his own. In this case, 
even though it is a white-collar and nonviolent crime, the MAOA-L defence would 
be more relevant and applicable than the murder example, as it could be argued that 
the highly impulsive response in this crime could be attributed to the effects of the 
MAOA-L gene. As such, it is important to consider the various types of crime where 
MAOA-L could be used as evidence, rather than focusing solely on violent, blue-






While blue-collar crime (or street crime) dominates crime-type research, the 
investigation of factors influencing white-collar crime sentencing is limited (Cassidy 
& Gibbons, 2019). There has been public speculation that white-collar crime is 
treated more leniently than blue-collar crime (Allen & Berg, 2016; Butler, 2012; 
Comino, 2018; Henning, 2013). Since white-collar crimes are dubbed as victimless 
crimes, perceptions of the seriousness of the crime can be reduced, as demonstrated 
through Rossi, Waite, Bose, and Berk’s (1974) study, where the general public 
ranked these crimes as low in seriousness compared to crimes against persons (e.g., 
assault). In a more recent study, Michel (2016) presented members of the general 
public with vignettes describing violent street crimes and physically harmful white-
collar crimes (e.g., failed safety protocols) and asked them to compare their 
seriousness and to suggest appropriate punishments. Similar to Rossi et al.’s study, 
white-collar crimes were perceived as less serious and resulted in less punitive 
ratings than blue-collar crimes. Michel speculated that the public may automatically 
associate white-collar crime with just financial loss rather than physical harm, and 
that the latter is perceived to be more punishable. As a former police officer stated, 
“[white-collar crimes] are not taken as seriously as other crimes because they’re not 
violent” (Brandolph, 2014, para. 17). 
Focal Concerns Theory 
The focal concerns model of sentencing suggests that sentencing decisions 
are influenced by three aspects: Blameworthiness, protection of community, and 
practical constraints and consequences (Steffensmeier, Ulmer, & Kramer, 2006). 
Blameworthiness is based on the idea that punishment increases depending on the 
offender’s culpability and degree of harm caused. Protection of the community 






harm. Practical constraints and consequences consider the offender’s ability to serve 
the time in jail (e.g., special needs, costs). When assessing these focal concerns, 
decision makers consider a number of factors. These factors can be legal (case-level 
information such as prior records and offence types), or extralegal (individual-level 
information such as age, race and gender; Steffensmeier, Painter-David, & Ulmer, 
2017). Empirical evidence into extralegal factors on white-collar crime sentencing 
has primarily focused on age (Holtfreter, 2013), gender (Van Slyke & Bales, 2013), 
and race (Hagan & Nagel, 1982). These legal and extralegal factors can impact the 
perception of defendant characteristics. Defendants who possess traits that are 
stereotypically defined as blameworthy and dangerous are expected to receive more 
severe punishments (Ray & Dollar, 2013). For example, if considering the role of 
race, the focal concerns theory predicts that racial stereotypes associated with 
particular crimes may play a role in sentencing decisions by influencing perceptions 
of offender blameworthiness and dangerousness (Cassidy & Gibbs, 2019).  
This prediction has been borne out in a number of studies. For example, there 
is an assumption that there is an association between white defendants and white-
collar crimes, and black defendants and blue-collar crimes, likely due to stereotypes 
(Gordon, Bindrim, McNicholas, & Walden, 1988). In terms of sentencing decisions, 
when the defendant’s race is perceived as being typical of committing a specific type 
of crime (e.g., black defendants and blue-collar crime), this will lead to harsher 
sentences. Contrastingly, if the race is not typical of the crime, and not in line with 
internal stereotypes (e.g., black defendants and white-collar crime), then this will 
result in lenient sentences (Cassidy & Gibbs, 2019). While race is not a focus of this 
study, this pattern may be clear in other information that can be stereotyped. It can be 






impulsivity and aggressiveness) is likely to be stereotypical of a blue-collar crime as 
opposed to a white-collar crime, because the former is typically associated with 
violent connotations compared to the latter. 
Present Study 
The review of the literature demonstrates that findings regarding the impact 
of genetic evidence on juror decision making is mixed, and there are a number of 
limitations. The majority of studies have been conducted in the USA, which is one of 
the few remaining countries to enforce capital punishment which consequently may 
have effects on juror sentencing judgments. Furthermore, cultural effects may be 
present, as demonstrated through differences between German (Fuss et al., 2015) and 
U.S. studies (Aspinwall et al., 2012). Studies have also neglected to consider white-
collar crimes, and have provided additional forensic evidence (such as neuroimaging 
or diagnosis of psychopathy) which may further influence results. The current study 
aims to address these limitations through evaluating Australian mock juror 
perspectives on their interpretation of a defendant possessing the MAOA-L gene, and 
whether these perspectives differ if presented with a white-collar crime or a blue-
collar crime.  
Despite mixed findings to date, it appears there is a general consensus that 
genetic evidence reduces culpability, but can aggravate, or not have an effect on, the 
sentencing. The overarching aim of this study is to investigate the influence of 
genetic information on mock juror decisions, and whether this differs between the 
type of crime. Within this, the study also aims to provide details of factors that may 
influence these decisions, such as sympathy. The review of the literature has led to 






• Participants will perceive the defendant as less culpable for the crime when a 
genetic explanation is presented, compared to those who do not receive 
additional evidence. 
• Participants will perceive the defendant as more dangerous when a genetic 
explanation is presented, compared to those who do not receive additional 
evidence. 
• Participants will recommend more severe sentencing when a genetic 
explanation is presented, compared to those who do not receive additional 
evidence. 
The focal concerns theory provides for prediction of the interaction between 
crime type (i.e., white-collar or blue-collar) and genetic information (i.e., MAOA 
gene or no gene), through the assumption that blue-collar crime will be 
stereotypically associated with the gene, likely leading to higher ratings of 
culpability (blameworthiness) and perceived dangerousness (i.e., to protect the 
community) of the defendant. As a result, this should also increase sentence severity. 
Because white-collar crime may not stereotypically be associated with the gene, this 
should lead to lower ratings of defendant culpability, a higher perceived 
dangerousness of the defendant, and decreased sentence severity. The understanding 
and review of this theory has led to the development of the following hypotheses: 
• The presence of the genetic information will result in higher ratings of 
perceived culpability in the blue-collar crime condition than the white-collar 
crime condition. 
• The presence of the genetic information will result in higher ratings of 
perceived dangerousness of the defendant in the blue-collar crime condition 






• The presence of the genetic information will result in more severe sentences 
in the blue-collar crime condition than the white-collar crime condition. 
Method 
Design 
Ethical approval for this study was obtained from the Tasmanian Social 
Sciences Human Research Ethics Committee (ethics reference number: H0018144, 
Appendix A). This study implemented a between-groups factorial design, with two 
independent variables: MAOA-L gene information (present vs. absent) and type of 
crime (white-collar vs. blue-collar), which were manipulated through vignette 
presentation. The dependent variables were culpability, perceived dangerousness, 
and sentence severity, which were measured through a number of questions. As part 
of requirement for a separate study, participants read a second vignette and 
completed similar questions – order effects were considered and studies were 
counterbalanced.  
Participants 
A total of 217 people, compromising of first-year psychology students and 
members of the general public, were included in the final analysis. Only participants 
that were 18 years of age or older were eligible to take the survey and only complete 
survey data were eligible for analysis. Table 1 provides participant demographic 
information. Participants were recruited through means such as flyers (Appendix B), 
social media (Facebook; Appendix C), and SONA (for first-year UTAS psychology 
students). First-year psychology students were able to receive 45 minutes of course 
credit after participation and the general public had the option to go into a draw to 










Participant Demographic Information 
  
Characteristics N (Total = 217) 
Age     




     Male 
     Female 






     Caucasian 
     Aboriginal/Torres Strait Islander 
     Asian 
     Samoan 
     Pakistanian 








Previously enrolled units 
     University level neuroscience units  
     (including PSY101 and KHA106) 











Demographic and academic background. Participants were asked to 
provide their age (a drop-down box from 18 to 75+ years), gender, ethnicity, and 
whether they currently or previously were enrolled in KHA106 or PSY112, any 
university level law units, or neuroscience units (Appendix D). 
Vignettes. Participants were presented with a description of either a white-
collar or blue-collar crime, which was modified to have either genetic evidence 
included or not, resulting in four vignettes. The white-collar crime vignette described 
an alleged fraud that the defendant Michael had committed as a result of not 
receiving a promotion. In the second vignette, a blue-collar crime is described, 
containing details of an alleged assault, with the defendant Michael accused of 
assaulting a parking officer for giving him a ticket. Each vignette was 120 words 
long and matched in terms of level of detail of the crime. Additional information was 
added to manipulate the genetic information conditions. This information involved 
Michael’s defence lawyer demonstrating that Michael possessed the MAOA-L gene, 
with an expert witness testifying that this gene is associated with impulsive 
behaviour when childhood trauma is experienced. It was also demonstrated that 
Michael experienced such trauma. Participants in the control group did not receive 
any additional information. See Appendix E for full descriptions of each vignette. 
Comprehension check. A comprehension check required participants to 
identify what crime Michael was charged with. For white-collar crime vignettes, the 
options were ‘financial fraud’ and ‘bank robbery’. For blue-collar crime vignettes, 
the options were ‘attempted murder’ or ‘common assault’.  
Perceptions of culpability. Four items were used to measure culpability. 






– strongly agree) of whether Michael should be found guilty of the crime. The 
question ‘Michael was legally responsible for the crime’ was adapted from 
Aspinwall et al.’s (2012) study, and ‘Michael was in control of his actions’ was 
adapted from Scurich and Appelbaum’s study (2015). The fourth item was ‘The 
impulsive nature of the crime means Michael is less responsible for his actions’. 
Participants were asked to indicate their level of agreement to these questions on a 5-
point Likert scale (1 – strongly disagree, 5 – strongly agree). These four items were 
totalled together to form a total culpability score. Additional questions were asked 
for those who were presented with genetic information (see Appendix F for all 
survey questions). 
Perceptions of dangerousness. Three items were used to measure 
perceptions of dangerousness. The question ‘I would be fearful of Michael if I met 
him’ was adapted from Scurich and Appelbaum’s (2015) study. ‘Michael is a danger 
to society’ was also asked. These questions were asked to rate their level of 
agreement on a 5-point Likert scale (1 – strongly disagree, 5 – strongly agree). The 
question ‘How likely do you think it is that Michael will engage in a similar criminal 
act in the future’ was adapted from Lui et al. (2019) and asked participants to rate on 
a 5-point Likert scale (1 – very unlikely, 5 – very likely). These three items were 
totalled together to form a total perception of dangerousness score. Three additional 
questions were asked for the genetic information condition (Appendix F). One 
question was asked to measure levels of sympathy (‘I feel sympathy for Michael’). 
This question was adapted from Scurich and Appelbaum’s (2015) study in order to 
investigate whether sympathy played a role in sentencing decisions. 
Sentence severity. Six questions were used to measure sentence severity. 






bond, imprisonment, fine or no punishment), and provided with a drop-down box to 
indicate how many years Michael should be imprisoned for (0 – 50+ years). 
Participants were also asked to indicate on a sliding scale of 1 (not at all serious) to 
10 (very serious) how serious a crime assault/fraud is. In addition, participants were 
asked to indicate whether Michael’s sentence should be shorter or longer than the 
average length of four years (1 – shorter than average, 5 – a lot longer than average). 
The statements‘Michael should be punished less harshly because of the impulsive 
nature of the crime’ and ‘I believe Michael is capable of rehabilitation’ were also 
presented to all participants (1 – strongly disagree, 5 – strongly agree). All six items 
remained separate in analyses. Additional questions were presented to those in the 
genetic information condition (Appendix F).  
Public Understanding and Attitudes towards Genetics and Genomics 
Scale (PUGGS; Carver, Castéra, Gericke, Evangelista, & El-Hani, 2017). Two 
sections (section 2 and 3) of the PUGGS were used to measure participants’ general 
genetic knowledge (Appendix G). Section 2 of the PUGGS focuses on participant 
beliefs in genetic determinism. It includes 16 items of traits and asks participants to 
consider whether these traits are influenced by the environment or by genetics. 
Section 3 required ‘true/false/don’t know’ responses to nine statements on 
knowledge regarding gene-environment interaction. Correct scores in these sections 
indicate greater knowledge about genetics. These questions were used to determine 
what participants’ average level of genetic knowledge was. If there was a significant 
difference between groups, then this would be used as a covariate in data analyses. 
The PUGGS has been shown to be a reliable and valid questionnaire (Cronbach’s 







All participants completed the study online and were randomly allocated to 
one of four conditions through SurveyMonkey. Participants were first presented with 
an information sheet (Appendix H) and asked to click ‘agree’ as form of consent 
(Appendix I). Upon consent, participants were randomly allocated to one of the four 
conditions, and demographic and academic history information was obtained. 
Participants were then presented with one of four vignettes (Appendix E), followed 
by a comprehension check question. The dependent variable questions regarding 
sentence severity, culpability, and perceptions of dangerousness were then presented. 
Lastly, participants completed the PUGGS questionnaire (section 2 and 3). On 
completion of the survey, participants were thanked for their time and given the 
option to either receive credit (for psychology first-year students) or to go in a draw 
to obtain a $50.00 gift voucher (completed via a separate link to allow data to remain 
de-identified).  
Data Analysis 
Multiple 2 (genetic information present vs. absent) x 2 (white-collar vs. blue-
collar crime) Analyses of Variance (ANOVAs) were conducted for all continuous 
dependent variables to investigate the first set of hypotheses regarding genetic 
evidence. Chi-square analyses were used for categorical dependent variables. 
Independent samples t-tests were used to specifically investigate the difference 
between white-collar gene conditions and blue-collar gene conditions, to answer the 
second set of hypotheses regarding crime-type. Group differences from the PUGGs 
(section 2 and 3) and demographic factors were also analysed to determine whether 






partial eta-squared (ηp2) were: small = .01, medium = .06, large = .14, and cohen’s d 
(d) were: small = 0.2, medium = 0.5, large = 0.8 (Cohen, 1988). 
Results 
Data Screening  
In total, 251 people participated in this study. In the final analyses, 217 
participants results were used due to incomplete surveys (n = 25) and failed 
comprehension checks (n = 9).  
An analysis was conducted to test for outliers - extreme variables (regarded 
as being more than 3.29 standard deviations away from the mean) that have the 
potential to distort data (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). An inspection of the data 
indicated that there were a number of outliers that appeared to be problematic (in the 
dependent variables of jail years, perceptions of dangerousness, culpability, and 
crime seriousness). In accordance with Tabachnick and Fidell (2007), the raw scores 
for these outliers were changed to be one unit larger (or smaller) than the next most 
extreme score in the distribution. This rule was applied to all accumulative measures 
for consistency purposes. Nineteen outliers were changed under this rule. 
One-way ANOVAs were conducted to determine whether there were any 
between-group differences in age and in general knowledge regarding genetic 
information (as measured through the PUGGS section 2 and 3). Results are presented 
in Table 2 and indicate no significant group differences for age or genetic knowledge 
in section 2 or 3 of PUGGS. Chi-square analyses indicated no significant group 
differences for gender nor ethnicity (Table 2). These variables were therefore not 






Table 2  
Between Group Differences on Demographic and Genetic Knowledge Factors 
  Blue-Collar x 
Genetic (n = 51) 
Blue-Collar x 
Nongenetic (n = 57 ) 
White-Collar x 
Genetic (n = 65) 
White-Collar x 
Nongenetic (n = 44) 
F/ χ2 p η2/V 
 





















8.53 .482 .114 
Gender Female 
Male 













3.97 .681 .096 
PUGGS 2 Mean (SD) 50.06 (4.87) 49.98 (6.22) 50.32 (4.64) 50.49 (4.89) .098 .961 .001 







Multiple 2 x 2 ANOVAs were conducted through SPSS to investigate group 
differences (crime-type and genetic evidence) on perceptions of culpability, 
dangerousness, and sentence severity. These results were to respond specifically for 
gene-related hypotheses. Independent samples t-tests were ran to determine the 
difference between two specific groups: Blue-collar genetic and white-collar genetic 
conditions. These were used specifically for crime-type related hypotheses.  
Descriptive data for gene condition and crime condition are presented in Tables 3 
and 4 below. Further analyses were also conducted however these were not reported 







Table 3  
Descriptive Statistics for Genetic and Nongenetic Conditions 
Note: CI = Confidence interval; SS = Sentence severity 
* indicates a significant difference between this value and the first mean 
 
 Genetic Information (n = 116)  No Genetic Information (n = 101) 
DV Ratings M (SE) 95% CI  M (SE) 95% CI 
Culpability 14.86 (.163) [14.54, 15.18]  15.84 (.175)* [15.49, 16.18] 
Dangerousness 8.66 (.245) [8.17, 9.14]  7.93 (.263)* [7.41, 8.45] 
Jail years (SS) 3.09 (.274) [2.55, 3.63]  4.14 (.293)* [3.56, 4.72] 
Impulsive nature (SS) 2.50 (.109) [2.29, 2.72]  1.89 (.117)* [1.66, 2.12] 
Rehabilitation (SS) 4.11 (.086) [3.94, 4.28]  4.06 (.092) [3.88, 4.24] 
Average sentence (SS) 2.50 (.09) [2.33, 2.68]  2.86 (.096)* [2.67, 3.05] 






Table 4  








Note: CI = Confidence interval; SS = Sentence severity 
* indicates a significant difference between this value and the first mean
 Blue-Collar (n = 108)  White-Collar (n = 109) 
DV Ratings M (SE) 95% CI  M (SE) 95% CI 
Culpability 15.02 (.168) [14.69, 15.35]  15.68 (.170)* [15.34, 16.01] 
Dangerousness 9.57 (.252) [9.08, 10.07]  7.01 (.256)* [6.51, 7.52] 
Jail years (SS) 3.21 (.282) [2.65, 3.77]  4.02 (.285)* [3.46, 4.58] 
Impulsive nature (SS) 2.08 (.112) [1.86, 2.29]  2.31 (.114) [2.09, 2.54] 
Rehabilitation (SS) 4.10 (.088) [3.93, 4.27]  4.07 (.090) [3.89, 4.25] 
Average sentence (SS) 2.71 (.093) [2.53, 2.89]  2.66 (.094) [2.47, 2.84] 
Crime seriousness 7.54 (.171) [7.20, 7.88]  7.17 (.173) [6.83, 7.51] 






Perceptions of Culpability 
A 2 x 2 ANOVA was conducted to investigate whether genetic evidence or 
crime-type had an influence on perceptions of culpability (see Tables 3 and 4 for 
descriptive statistics). The Levene’s test was significant, indicating that caution 
should be used when interpreting results, even though ANOVA is relatively robust to 
breaches of assumptions (Field, 2013). There was a significant main effect for 
genetic evidence, F(1, 213) = 16.73, p < .001, ηp2 = .073, which is considered a 
medium effect. This result suggests that the defendant was perceived to be less 
culpable for the crime when presented alongside genetic evidence compared to no 
genetic evidence. There was also a significant main effect for crime-type, F(1, 213) = 
7.52, p = .007, ηp2 = .034, which is a small-medium effect. This shows that, overall, 
white-collar crime resulted in significantly higher culpability ratings than blue-collar 
crime (see Figure 1). There was no evidence for an interaction effect between genetic 
evidence and crime-type. 
 






An independent samples t-test was also conducted to examine specifically 
whether the presence of the gene provided different culpability ratings between blue-
collar or white-collar crime. With equal variances assumed, it was nonsignificant, 
t(114) = -1.66, p = .099, d = 0.31, demonstrating that there were no significant 
differences on genetic evidence influence between crime-types.  
Perceptions of Dangerousness 
A 2 x 2 ANOVA was conducted to investigate whether genetic evidence or 
crime-type had an influence on perceptions of dangerousness (see Tables 3 and 4 for 
descriptive statistics). The Levene’s test was nonsignificant, so the assumption of 
homogeneity was not violated. There was a significant main effect for genetic 
evidence, F(1, 213) = 4.11, p = .044, ηp2 = .019, which is considered a small effect. 
This shows that genetic evidence resulted in higher dangerousness perceptions than 
no genetic evidence. There was also a significant main effect for crime-type, F(1, 
213) = 40.90, p < .001, ηp2 = .193, which is considered a large effect. This 
demonstrates that blue-collar crime conditions resulted in higher dangerousness 
perceptions than white-collar crime. There was no evidence of an interaction.






 Sympathy levels were compared in a 2 x 2 ANOVA between groups to 
determine whether there was an influence of crime-type or genetic information on 
ratings of sympathy. The Levene’s test was significant, suggesting that caution 
should be used when interpreting these results. There was a significant main effect 
for genetic information, F(1, 213) = 32.21, p < .001, ηp2 = .131, which is a medium-
large effect, demonstrating that genetic evidence generated more sympathy than no 
genetic evidence. There was no significant main effect for crime-type, nor an 
interaction.  
An independent samples t-test was conducted to specifically test whether 
blue-collar gene and white-collar gene conditions differed. With equal variances 
assumed, the t-test was significant, t(114) = 4.46, p < .001, d = 0.50 (a medium 
effect), demonstrating that blue-collar genetic conditions (M = 9.75, SD = 2.71) 
resulted in higher dangerousness perceptions than white-collar genetic conditions (M 
= 7.57, SD = 2.52). 
Sentence Severity Judgments 
A chi-square analysis demonstrated that there was a significant difference 
between genetic and nongenetic conditions on punishment type (Table 5). Whilst 
imprisonment was determined to be appropriate by the majority in both conditions 
(53% for gene, 72.3% for no gene), a good behaviour bond or fine was considered 
more so in the genetic condition (30% and 17%) than nongenetic condition (19.8% 
and 7.9%). There was no significant differences between crime-types on punishment 






Table 5    
Chi-Square for Punishment Type for Genetic and Nongenetic Conditions 
* indicates a significant result 
 
Table 6 
Chi-Square for Punishment Type for Blue-Collar and White-Collar Conditions 
  
Punishment Type Genetic 
Information 
(n = 116) 
No genetic 
Information 
(n = 101) 
χ2 p V 
Good behaviour bond 35 (30%) 20 (19.8%) 9.32 .009* .207 
Fine 20 (17%) 8 (7.9%)    
Imprisonment 61 (53%) 73 (72.3%)    
None 0 0    
Punishment Type Blue-Collar 
(n = 108) 
White-Collar 
(n = 109) 
χ2 p V 
Good behaviour bond 32 (29.6%) 23 (21.1%) 5.04 .08 .152 
Fine 9 (8.3%) 19 (17.4%)    
Imprisonment 67 (62.1%) 67 (61.5%)    






A 2 x 2 ANOVA was conducted to investigate whether there was a difference 
between crime-types on ‘how serious a crime is assault/fraud’ (see Table 4 for 
descriptive statistics). There were no significant differences, meaning that 
participants found both types of crimes to be around the same level of seriousness 
(about seven out of ten). Multiple 2 x 2 ANOVAs were conducted to investigate 
whether genetic evidence or crime-type had an influence on various sentence 
severity items (see Tables 3 and 4 for descriptive statistics). In terms of jail years, the 
Levene’s test was significant, so caution should be taken in interpretation of the 
results. There was a significant main effect for genetic evidence for jail length, F(1, 
213) = 6.86, p = .009, ηp2 = .031 (a small-medium effect). In particular, participants 
presented with genetic evidence gave an average of a 3-year sentence, compared to 
those presented with no genetic evidence, who averaged a 4-year sentence. There 
was also a significant main effect for crime-type, F(1, 213) = 4.06, p = .045, ηp2 = 
.019 (small effect). Specifically, on average, participants in the blue-collar condition 
gave a recommendation of a 3-year sentence, compared to white-collar crime which 
averaged a 4-year sentence. There was no significant interaction effect.  






 In terms of whether the defendant’s sentence should be shorter or longer than 
the average length of four years, there was a significant main effect for genetic 
information, F(1, 213) = 7.23, p = .008, ηp2 = .033 (a small effect), with genetic 
conditions suggesting that the sentence should be shorter than average. There was no 
significant main effect for crime-type nor an interaction. 
There was a main effect for genetic information on ‘Michael should be 
punished less harshly because of the impulsive nature of the crime’, F(1, 213) = p < 
.001, ηp2 = .065 (a medium effect) with participants in genetic conditions agreeing 
with this statement more strongly than nongenetic conditions. There was no main 
effect for this on crime-type or interaction. For ‘Michael is capable of 
rehabilitation’, no significant effects were found for crime-type or genetic 
conditions. 
An independent samples t-test was conducted to specifically test whether 
blue-collar gene and white-collar gene conditions differed in lengths of 
imprisonment years. With equal variances assumed, the t-test was nonsignificant, 
t(114) = -1.08, p = .283, d = 0.20, demonstrating no significant differences between 
the two conditions. 
Discussion 
The present study investigated how genetic evidence influenced mock juror 
decision making on perceptions of a defendant, and whether this effect differed 
between crime-types. Presentation of the MAOA-L gene alongside a defendant’s 
case increased perceptions of dangerousness, but also reduced perceptions of 
culpability and sentence severity. This supports the first two hypotheses (the 
defendant will be perceived as less culpable and more dangerous when a genetic 






recommended when a genetic explanation is presented). In terms of the interaction 
between genetic information and crime-type, participants perceived the defendant 
with the gene as more dangerous when it was a blue-collar crime compared to a 
white-collar crime, but no differences were found for perceptions of culpability or 
sentence severity. This supports the fifth hypothesis (presence of genetic information 
will result in higher dangerousness in blue-collar than white-collar crime) but not the 
fourth or sixth (presence of the genetic information will result in higher culpability 
ratings and more severe sentences in blue-collar crime than white-collar crime). 
Genetic Evidence on Perceptions of the Defendant and Sentence Severity 
Judgements  
The hypothesis that perceptions of culpability would be reduced when genetic 
evidence was supported, suggesting that mock jurors believed that possession of the 
MAOA-L gene was sufficient enough to reduce control of the defendant’s actions. 
When genetic evidence was not introduced, the defendant was seen as being more 
culpable for his actions. Other studies similarly found that genetic information 
reduced perceptions of culpability and legal responsibility of the defendant, while at 
the same time finding either no effect on sentence length (Appelbaum & Scurich, 
2014; Appelbaum et al., 2015; Fuss et al., 2015) or that sentence length was 
increased (Lui et al., 2019). Our findings demonstrated that sentence length was 
decreased by inclusion of genetic information. One explanation of a mitigating effect 
being discovered compared to other studies may be due to crime-type. As Denno’s 
(2011) analysis found, genetic evidence was sometimes not considered to be strong 
enough to outweigh the aggravating evidence when crimes were particularly violent 
(e.g. murder). It may be that because this study looked at relatively mild crimes 






mitigating evidence. Hence, this may be why a mitigated sentence was found 
contrasting to previous studies (e.g., Appelbaum et al., 2015). 
Sentencing decisions were hypothesised to result in harsher sentences for 
genetic evidence compared to no genetic evidence. The majority of participants 
across all conditions thought imprisonment to be the most appropriate form of 
punishment, however a good behaviour bond or fine was considered by more people 
when a genetic explanation was presented compared to no additional evidence (Table 
5). This suggests that when presented with genetic evidence, people may be more 
open to looking at alternatives to imprisonment. For example, in Fuss et al.’s (2015) 
study, judges were more likely to suggest a rehabilitative program for defendants 
with the gene, than to suggest imprisonment. It is possible that the mock jurors in 
this study may have felt the same way. While views regarding rehabilitation was 
investigated, no significance was found. This is possibly because rehabilitation was 
only measured on one question on a 5-point Likert scale and so perhaps there was 
insuffient variance to differentiate between opinions. Further studies that focus more 
on perceptions of rehabilitation, using more sensitive measures, would further 
understanding in this area. 
In terms of imprisonment sentences, mock jurors who received genetic 
evidence indicated that the defendant should be punished less harshly due to the 
impulsive nature of the crime, more so than those who did not receive genetic 
evidence. In other words, the presentation of genetic evidence was influential in 
mitigating the sentence because of its impulsive nature. When mock jurors were 
asked to provide an estimated jail sentence length, those who were presented with 
genetic evidence suggested lesser sentences (approx. three years imprisonment) 






found in previous studies (e.g., Aspinwall et al., 2012), but was in contrast to the 
hypothesis that genetic information would aggravate sentence length. This may be 
because mock jurors valued the loss of control (caused by the gene) important 
enough to reduce the blame on the defendant and thus reduce the sentence severity. 
It is interesting to note that in both this study and Aspinwall et al.’s (2012) 
study, the difference in sentencing suggestions was approximately one year. While 
this could be considered a substantial difference, it also demonstrates that the 
possession of the gene cannot, and does not, excuse a defendant from full criminal 
responsibility in the views of the participants (McSwiggan et al., 2017). The genetic 
evidence therefore only has a limited mitigating effect, which could potentially be 
perceived as a weak form of evidence for defence lawyers. Nevertheless, these 
results demonstrate that genetic evidence could indeed be presented in court as a 
form of mitigating evidence.  
The combined result of reduced culpability and reduced sentence severity 
aligns with the theory of dyadic morality, which suggests that victims are seen as less 
blameworthy for a crime (Gray & Wegner, 2011). In this scenario, Michael may be 
seen as a victim because he endured childhood abuse. Results indicated that 
participants viewed the defendant with more sympathy when presented with genetic 
information compared to no genetic information. This finding tends to support the 
theory – as feelings of sympathy may have increased the likelihood of seeing 
Michael as a victim. In other words, according to the theory, it may not be the 
information about the gene that results in mitigated sentences, but the information 







The defendant was also perceived to be more dangerous when equipped with 
the MAOA-L gene, compared to no gene. This effect has been found in previous 
studies (Appelbaum & Scurich, 2014; Costa et al., 2017). Considering perceptions of 
culpability were also reduced, the heightened perceived dangerousness may be due to 
ideas of the MAOA-L gene leading to a lack of control, meaning that the defendant 
could lash out unpredictably at any time (Berryessa, 2014). Nevertheless, it is clear 
that despite the defendant being perceived as more dangerous, the influence of the 
gene had a substantial impact that was enough to reduce perceptions of culpability 
and ultimately result in a reduced jail sentence.  
The findings demonstrate that the MAOA-L has mitigating properties which 
can be influential in a courtroom trial. Mock jurors considered the genetic evidence 
to be influential enough to reduce perceptions of culpability and sentence length. 
This has implications for defence lawyers, of whom can build their case to 
demonstrate that their defendant had little control over their actions due to possession 
of a gene that cannot be regulated. Like previous cases (e.g., State v. Waldroup), the 
presentation of this gene as a form of evidence can result in mitigated sentences, 
which could lead to reduced jail time or even avoid capital punishment (e.g., in U.S. 
trials).  
The Influence of Genetic Evidence in Different Types of Crime 
This study also aimed to investigate the differences between crime-types on 
genetic evidence influence. Genetic influence on perceptions of defendant culpability 
and sentence severity did not differ between the blue-collar crime and white-collar 
crime conditions. This did not support the hypotheses that genetic evidence would 
result in more severe sentences and higher levels of culpability for blue-collar crime 






differences on genetic explanation effectiveness between crime-type (i.e., an assault, 
damage to property, and misbehaving 8-year old). While Scurich and Appelbaum did 
not directly look at blue-collar and white-collar crime differences, their crime-types 
were similar to the present study’s in that there was a violent (assault) compared to a 
non-violent (misbehaving 8-year old) scenario.  
The present study’s resulted indicated that culpability did not differ between 
crime-types. This is in contrast to Robbin and Litton’s (2018) study, which also 
investigated crime-type differences (robbery and homicide), but found that 
perceptions of blameworthiness (i.e., culpability) increased for homicide compared 
to robbery. It is possible this difference is because the present study’s crime vignettes 
involved reactive aggression (i.e., a spur of the moment frustration), instead of 
instrumental aggression (i.e., a carefully planned aggression) as used by Robbin and 
Litton. As discussed by Levitt and Manson (2007), the aggression produced by the 
gene is the result of impulsivity rather than something carefully planned. Therefore, 
it is likely that the difference between our results and Robbins and Litton’s results, is 
due to their study having an instrumental aggressive crime (robbery) and a reaction 
aggressive crime (homicide). 
The present study found that the defendant (paired with the gene) who 
committed a blue-collar crime resulted in higher levels of perceived dangerousness 
than the white-collar criminal. This was expected and supported the hypothesis that 
mock jurors presented with genetic information would perceive the defendant as 
more dangerous in the blue-collar rather than white-collar condition. This may 
simply be the result of the crime being of a violent nature, compared to fraud which 
was not of a violent nature. Indeed, while the possession of the gene may be enough 






difference between white-collar gene and white-collar control differences, Figure 2), 
it appears more likely that crime of a violent (or even, physical) nature will elicit 
more fear than crime of a nonviolent (or nonphysical) nature. 
The focal concerns theory suggests that sentencing decisions are influenced 
by perceptions of blameworthiness (i.e., culpability), protection of the community 
(i.e., dangerousness), and practical constrains (e.g., costs; Steffensmeier et al., 2006). 
The theory also posits that extralegal factors (e.g., age, race) use ideas of stereotypes 
(e.g., a white defendant committing a white-collar crime) to influence the perception 
of these features (Steffensmeier et al., 2017). While this study did not investigate 
practical constraints, it looked at whether the extralegal factor of possessing the 
MAOA gene influenced perceptions of blameworthiness and protection of 
community, and whether this influenced sentencing decisions. It was assumed that 
possession of the MAOA-L gene was stereotypical of a blue-collar crime, thus this 
crime-type would be perceived more negatively than the nonstereotypical pairing of 
the gene with a white-collar crime. While it was found that dangerousness (i.e., 
protection of the community) was influenced by the gene (i.e., extralegal factor), 
results were not found for either culpability (blameworthiness) nor sentence severity. 
Hence, our findings could not be sufficiently explained by the focal concerns theory. 
The results suggest that crime-type may not influence how genetic 
information is interpreted by mock jurors. While the focal concerns theory suggests 
that stereotypical information can lead to increased sentence severity (Cassidy & 
Gibbs, 2019), this effect was not detected in this sample. Furthermore, no effect was 
detected for difference between perceptions of crime seriousness, suggesting that 
white-collar crime may not be seen as any less serious than blue-collar crime 






established whether the use of the MAOA-L gene would be more influential in a 
blue-collar crime case or a white-collar crime case. This limits the implications of 
recommendations that could be provided to defence lawyers. Despite these findings, 
this study is, to the best of the author’s knowledge, the only one of its kind to 
investigate the difference of genetic evidence perceptions between blue-collar crime 
and white-collar crime. 
Strengths, Limitations and Future Directions 
The present study had a wide range of participants (i.e., age range; not just 
university students), which allowed an adequate representation of the diverse range 
of community members, strengthening external validity for the characteristics of a 
juror. Our sample was unique in that it was an entirely Australian sample, something 
that has been lacking in this field of research and is an area requiring further 
investigation. Considering this form of evidence is majorly used in capital trials, and 
the death penalty is not used in Australia, it is unclear if or when this specific form of 
evidence would realistically occur in Australian trials. Further knowledge and 
analysis of the use of the MAOA-L gene in Australian court trials is therefore 
required. Our results differed between German (Fuss et al., 2015) and U.S. (e.g., 
Appelbaum et al., 2015) populations, suggesting that Australian populations may 
perceive this form of evidence differently. In saying this, it is important to note that 
this population was also majorly Tasmanian, which may, again, prove differences 
between other parts of Australia and different jurisdictions. From an initial 
interpretation, it may be that different countries (or states) possess different internal 
values or views about what appropriate punishment is. Future research should 






differences may exist. Investigating juror attributes and internal beliefs may also be 
beneficial in this comparison.  
To the best of the author’s knowledge, this study is the only one of its kind to 
compare the effects of genetic evidence between white-collar and blue-collar crime, 
and to implement the focal concerns theory in terms of evaluating genetic evidence 
perceptions. Moreover, participants considered both types of crime vignettes to be 
approximately the same level of seriousness (see Table 4). This strengthens findings 
because it indicates that the variation in results are likely due to the intended 
condition and genetic manipulations rather than other factors. 
While the focal concerns theory did not appear to explain our findings, future 
studies may investigate this further, potentially by directly assessing mock juror 
perceptions of the three aspects of focal concerns (blameworthiness, protection of 
community, practical constraints), or different forms of crime (e.g., a crime that 
cannot be explained by an extralegal factor compared to one that can). Considering 
that the MAOA-L gene influences not only aggression, but impulsivity, it may be 
beneficial to compare two nonviolent crimes, as the violent and nonviolent 
comparison may have influenced results. This study also addressed potential 
limitations and confounds from other studies by avoiding the use of injuries, brain 
imaging, and mental illness. By presenting a brief explanation of genetic evidence, 
we can be sure that participants are only influenced by information regarding the 
gene.  
There are a number of limitations in this study. The ecological validity of this 
study was reduced due to the online nature of the vignettes and questionnaire. The 
atmosphere and emotions within a courtroom trial are much different to a computer 






more (or less) convincing than a written presentation (Appelbaum et al., 2015). 
Furthermore, the vignettes themselves have the capacity to influence results just 
through wording, length, and complexity, which should be kept in consideration 
(Appelbaum & Scurich, 2014). While research has suggested that the use of online 
studies produces high validity (Gosling, Vazire, Srivastava, & John, 2004), it is still a 
possibility that participants may not understand information or give honest ratings. 
The comprehension check in our survey was implemented to minimise this concern.  
It is possible that our results were influenced by reactions to the defendant’s 
childhood abuse, rather than his genetic predisposition. As Robbins and Litton 
(2018) found, childhood abuse was the most influential aspect in their findings of 
reduced culpability, as it emphasised the perception of the defendant as a victim. 
Further research should be conducted with genetic evidence separate to childhood 
trauma to determine whether this effect still stands. Furthermore, since our results 
support the theory of dyadic morality, future research should focus on this theory, 
such as exploring whether jurors do indeed perceive the defendant as a victim. 
It is also important to consider that jurors are typically not involved in 
sentencing decisions. Nevertheless, the results found in this study do demonstrate 
that if this form of evidence was to be used (in any stage of a trial), it would help in 
building a sympathetic view of the defendant that could potentially lead to a reduced 
sentence. 
Implications and Conclusion 
This study demonstrates that genetic evidence has the potential to result in 
mitigated sentences. Reduced culpability and heightened sympathy appeared to be 
influential factors that outweighed the increased perception of dangerousness. This 






2012), but in this study, mitigating circumstances outweighed aggravating. The 
findings indicate some support for the theory of dyadic morality, however the 
influence of childhood trauma may an underlying factor. The results indicated by 
differences in crime-type showed that genetic evidence provided no significant 
differences between blue-collar or white-collar crimes, except for perceptions of 
dangerousness. This suggests that the focal concerns theory may not be applicable to 
these results, and furthermore suggests that genetic evidence may be perceived 
equally despite type of crime. Whilst these are preliminary findings, and further 
research should be conducted for crime-type differences, genetic evidence may be a 
form of mitigating evidence that can be used across a wide range of case scenarios. 
This has implications for the criminal justice system, in that genetic evidence can be 
invaluable for lawyers and other legal authorities when considering a defendant’s 
case, as it can result in reduced perceptions of culpability and lead to lesser 
sentences. While there are no guarantees that introducing genetic evidence of the 
presence of the MAOA-L gene will mitigate the defendant’s sentence, this study has 
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Please answer the following questions about yourself. 








• Aboriginal/Torres Strait Islander 
• Asian 
• Other (please specify) 
Are you currently enrolled in, or have previously been enrolled in, any of the 
following? 
KHA106 – Brain, Mind and Emotion or PSY112 Brain and Behaviour  
Any university level law units       










Michael is a 35-year-old male being charged with financial fraud. 
 
Michael has been working as a corporate bank teller for the past 10 years. On 
October 15th, 2018, he was told by his manager that his application for promotion 
had been turned down. Much to Michael’s annoyance and dismay, his least favourite 
co-worker Steve was the recipient of the promotion, despite being less experienced 
than Michael.  When Steve’s promotion was announced to the office, everyone went 
and congratulated Steve. Michael started shaking with anger. In a fit of rage, he 
transferred over a million dollars from several large company accounts into his own 
bank account, and also took money out of Steve’s personal account. Two weeks 
later, an investigation traced back the missing funds to Michael, and he was arrested. 
 
Michael has been charged with financial fraud, an offence of which usually incurs a 
4-year jail sentence.  
 
Blue-Collar Vignette: 
Michael is a 35-year-old male being charged with assault.  
  
On the evening of October 15th, 2018, Michael was walking to his car after work. As 
he approached his car, he noticed a parking officer writing him a ticket. He ran up to 
the officer and explained he was late due to a meeting at work. The parking officer, 
Steve, said he couldn’t cancel the ticket, and stuck it to the windscreen of Michael’s 
car. This made Michael instantly angry, and he began yelling at Steve, saying it 
wasn’t his fault he was late. Steve attempted to walk away, but Michael grabbed him 
and punched him in the face. Steve was knocked unconscious and hit his head on the 
ground, and was later diagnosed with possibly long term brain damage. 
 
Michael has been charged with common assault, an offence of which usually incurs a 
4-year jail sentence. 
 
Condition 1: White-collar control 
No additional information provided 
 
Condition 2: Blue-collar control 
No additional information provided 
 
Condition 3: White-collar + genetics  






Michael's defence lawyer introduces evidence from a genetic test showing that 
Michael has a specific form of the MAOA gene (sometimes known as the ‘warrior’ 
gene), which can predispose people to being more impulsive. The lawyer also 
provides evidence that as a child, Michael was repeatedly severely abused by his 
father, often being beaten with a belt as discipline. The defence lawyer argues that 
because Michael possesses this version of the gene, and was exposed to childhood 
violence, it is difficult for him to be able to control his behaviour. 
 
An expert witness testifies that individuals with this version of the MAOA gene have 
a high risk of impulsive and violent behaviour, if they also have a history of 
childhood abuse.  
 
Condition 4: Blue-collar + genetics  








Dependent Variable Questions 
 
# = in genetic information conditions only 
SD = Strongly disagree 
SA = Strongly agree 
 
Comprehension checks 
• What is the crime Michael is charged with? [options: assault conditions: 
assault/attempted murder; fraud condition financial fraud/bank robbery] 
 
Perceptions of Culpability 
• Michael should be found guilty of this crime [1 = SD – 5 = SA] 
• Michael was legally responsible for this crime [1 = SD – 5 = SA] 
• Michael was in control of his actions [1 = SD – 5 = SA] 
• The impulsive nature of the crime means Michael is less responsible for his 
actions [1 = SD – 5 = SA] 
• The family violence Michael experienced as a child means he is less 
responsible for this crime [1 = SD – 5 = SA] # 
• The fact that Michael has the version of the MAOA gene that is associated 
with impulsivity means he is less responsible [1 = SD – 5 = SA] # 
 
Perceptions of Dangerousness 
• I would be fearful of Michael if I met him [1 = SD – 5 = SA] 
• Michael is a danger to society [1 = SD – 5 = SA] 
• How likely do you think it is that Michael will engage in a similar criminal act 
in the future [1 = very unlikely – 5 = very likely] 
• Because Michael has a type of gene associated with increased impulsivity, he 
is less in control of his actions [1 = SD – 5 = SA] # 
• Possessing the MAOA gene means that Michael is more likely to be violent [1 
= SD – 5 = SA] # 
• Experiencing violence as a child means Michael is more likely to be violent as 
an adult [1 = SD – 5 = SA] # 
•  I feel sympathy for Michael [1 = SD – 5 = SA] 
 
Sentence severity 
• What punishment do you think Michael deserves? [participants were able to 
select one option] 
⎯ None – he should not be found guilty of this crime 
⎯ Good behaviour bond (so will stay free, but if he commits another 






⎯ Fine (so will have to pay up to $2,800, but remain free) 
⎯ Imprisonment (will go to prison for a period of time) 
• Using the dropdown tool, please indicate how many years you believe Michael 
should get imprisoned for [0-50+ years] 
• On a scale of 1-10, how serious a crime do you think fraud/assault is? 
• The average sentence for this crime is 4-year imprisonment. What sentence do 
you believe Michael should get? [1 = A lot shorter than average 5 = a lot 
longer than average] 
• Michael should be punished less harshly because of the impulsive nature of the 
crime [1 = SD – 5 = SA] 
•    I believe Michael is capable of rehabilitation [1 = SD – 5 = SA] 
• The information about the MAOA gene should be taken into account when 
Michael is sentenced [1 = SD – 5 = SA] # 
• Given the information about the MAOA gene, Michael should be punished 
more harshly [1 = SD – 5 = SA] # 
• Given the information about the MAOA gene, Michael’s sentence should be 
reduced [1 = SD – 5 = SA] # 
• Given the information about Michael’s traumatic childhood, Michael should be 
punished more harshly [1 = SD – 5 = SA] # 
• Given the information about Michael’s traumatic childhood, Michael’s sentence 
should be reduced [1 = SD – 5 = SA] † 
• Is there any information Michael’s lawyer could present that you believe would 
mitigate (reduce) his sentence? (list of options, tick all that apply) 
o Genetic predisposition to violence 
o Traumatic childhood background 
o A clean criminal record before this crime 
o Mental illness 
o Intellectual disability 
o Michael accepts responsibility and shows huge remorse for what 
he had done 
o He was going through a tough time at the time of the crime (e.g., 
death in the family) 
o Nothing would result in a more lenient sentence 
 
Relevance of information 
• The genetic information had an impact on my decision [1 = SD – 5 = SA] # 
• The information about the childhood trauma had an impact on my decision [1 = 








Public Understanding and Attitudes towards Genetics and Genomics Scale 
(PUGGS) Section 2 and 3 
Section 2: Belief in Genetic determinism 
People vary in traits (physical features, behaviours, diseases and disorders), such as 
those shown in the table below. Genetic differences and environmental differences 
contribute to this variation. Environmental differences can for example be 
differences in culture, upbringing, lifestyle, eating habits, or exposure to pollution. In 
the table below please indicate to what extent you think genetic and environmental 
differences contribute to these traits. 
For each of the traits below, please choose one of the options: 
1= Only environmental differences contribute to the trait 
2= Mainly environmental differences contribute to the trait 
3= Both genetic and environmental differences contribute to the same extent to the 
trait 
4= Mainly genetic differences contribute to the trait 
5= Only genetic differences contribute to the trait 
 
• Example: Eye colour 
• Height 
• Bipolar disorder 
• Diabetes 
• Colour blindness 
• Schizophrenia 
• Breast cancer 
• Interest in fashion 
• Addiction to gambling 
• Political beliefs 
• Intelligence in adults 
• Severe depression 
• Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) 
• Asthma 
• Violent behaviour 
• Religious beliefs 






Section 3: Knowledge about gene-environment interaction 
 
Please read each statement below and choose one of the options (True, False or 
Don´t know). Please only choose “don’t know” if you do not understand the 
statement. 
 
1. A gene codes directly for a trait or disease. 
2. Most human traits and diseases are caused by a single gene. 
3. A single gene can influence several different traits or diseases. 
4. A person´s height is influenced by one gene only. 
5. Most traits and diseases are influenced by many different genes. 
6. Most traits and diseases are caused by environmental factors only (such as 
diet and lifestyle). 
7. A gene can only influence a single trait or disease. 
8. Most traits and diseases are caused by both genes and environmental factors. 









Thankyou for completing our survey. If you would like to go in the draw to win a 
$50.00 Coles Group gift voucher, or if you are a first-year psychology student who 












Participant Information Sheet 
The Effects of Defendant and Juror Attributes in Legal Settings 
Participant Information Sheet 
 
1. Invitation 
You are invited to participate in a study examining the influence of juror and 
defendant characteristics on criminal trial outcomes. This study is being conducted as 
part of honours and masters research projects under the supervision of Dr Christine 
Padgett, from the School of Medicine (Psychology) at the University of Tasmania. 
Before you decide to participate in this research, it is essential that you are aware of 
why the research is being conducted, and what is required of your participation in 
this study. Please take the time to carefully read the information provided, and feel 
free to ask any questions if necessary.   
2. What is the purpose of this study? 
The purpose of this study is to explore the influence of offender and juror 
characteristics on criminal trial outcomes.     
3. Why have I been invited to participate?   
You are eligible to participate in this study because you’re either an undergraduate 
UTAS student, or a member from the general population over the age of 18. 
Participation in this study is completely voluntary and there will be no consequence 
for individuals who do not wish to participate in this study.  
4. What will I be asked to do?  
This is an online study that will begin with you providing your informed consent.  If 
you consent to participate, you will be asked to compete a brief demographics 
questionnaire, including questions about your age, gender and ethnicity. You will be 
then be asked to read two hypothetical trial scenarios that describes either a physical 
assault or fraud charge, and answer questions relating to the trial, as well as other 
questions relating to your own beliefs about human behaviour in general. Taking part 
in this survey will take approximately 30 minutes, and all data are anonymous. 
5. Are there any possible benefits from participation in this study? 
It is not anticipated that your involvement in this study will result in any direct 
benefits. However, the data collected from this research will provide further 
understanding of how offender and juror characteristics influence criminal 
sentencing decisions. 
After completing this study, non-psychology undergraduates and members of the 
general public will have the opportunity to go into the draw to win a $50 Coles/Myer 
gift voucher. First year psychology undergraduates from UTAS will be provided 
with the choice to either enter the gift voucher draw or receive 30 minute research 
participation course credit via SONA for their involvement in this study.  






There are no anticipated risks of participating in this study. However, as there is 
some description of violence.  If you feel discomfort at any point during the study, 
please stop immediately. If needed, there are phone support services available such 
as Lifeline (13 11 14) or Beyond Blue (1300 224 636), and UTas students have 
access to UTas counselling services 
(http://www.utas.edu.au/students/shw/counselling). 
7. What if I change my mind during or after the study?  
Your involvement in this study is completely voluntary. While we would be pleased 
to have you participate in this study, we respect your right to decline. If you decide to 
discontinue participation at any time throughout this study, there will be no 
consequences and you may do so without specifying an explanation. Withdrawing 
consent to participate in this study will not affect your relationship with the 
University of Tasmania. All information will be managed in a confidential manner, 
and your name will not be affiliated with any publications of this research.  
8. What will happen to the information when this study is over? 
All data that is collected from this study will be safely secured and kept confidential.  
It will be securely saved on a password-protected server in the School of Psychology. 
In accordance with National Ethics standards, we would like to retain your 
anonymous (de-identified) data to also use in future related research projects.  This 
data would not contain any identifying information about you.  
9. How will the results of the study be published? 
As this research is part of a study for honours and masters projects, the relevant 
findings will be reported in honours and masters theses, and may also be published in 
academic journals.  No participants will be identified in this research publication. If 
you would like to receive a copy of the results of the research, please inform the 
investigators. 
10. What if I have questions about this study? 
If you have any questions or require further information regarding this study, please 
feel free to contact the research team involved: 
• Dr Christine Padgett: Email: Christine.padgett@utas.edu.au or phone 6226 
5718 
This study has been approved by the Tasmanian Social Sciences Human Research 
Ethics Committee. If you have concerns or complaints about the conduct of this 
study, please contact the Executive Officer of the HREC (Tasmania) Network on 
+61 3 6226 6254 or email human.ethics@utas.edu.au. The Executive Officer is the 
person nominated to receive complaints from research participants. Quote ethics 
number H0018144. 
 
Thank you for taking the time to read this information sheet, and your interest 
in this study. This information sheet is for you to keep. If you do wish to take 
part within this study, you will be required to fill out an informed consent form 
online prior to taking part in the study. By submitting the consent form, this 








Participant Consent Form 
 
 
The Effects of Defendant and Juror Attributes in Legal Settings                                                                                                                                                                              
Participant Consent Form 
 
1. I agree to take part in the research study named above. 
2. I have read and understood the Information Sheet for this study. 
3. The nature and possible effects of the study have been explained to me. 
4. I understand that this study involves taking part in an online survey, where I 
will be asked to read a description about a hypothetical criminal trial scenario, and 
that I will then answer a series of questions.   
5. I understand that all research data will be securely stored on the University of 
Tasmania premises, and that my anonymous/de-identified data will be kept 
indefinitely and may be used in related research  
6. Any questions that I have asked have been answered to my satisfaction. 
7. I understand that the researcher(s) will maintain confidentiality and that any 
information I supply to the researcher(s) will be used only for the purposes of the 
research.  
8. I understand that the results of the study will be published so that I cannot be 
identified as a participant.  
9. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I may withdraw at 
any time during the survey without any effect. I understand that I will not be able to 
withdraw my data after completing the survey as it has been collected anonymously.  
Please select your choice below. You may print a copy of this consent form for your 
records.  
Clicking on the “Agree” button indicates that: 
• You have read and understand the above information 
• You voluntarily agree to participate 





















Please refer to the data file for additional output. 
 
 
 
